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1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Many developing countries are currently undergoing structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) in which liberalization of the various sectors of the 
economy is a major policy thrust. Accordingly, the free-market system is being 
assigned an increasing role in the allocation of resources. Of the various 
sectors that have been regulated, the financial sector is perhaps the most 
important given its role as the lubricant of the engine of growth that drives the 
economy. 
In Nigeria, financial repression, characterized by the policies of directed 
credit and an interest rate ceiling, is believed to have caused some 
imperfections in the operations of the financial market. McKinnon (1988) 
asserted that firiancial repression policies such as usury restrictions on interest 
rates, heavy reserve requirements on bank deposits, and compulsory credit 
allocations, interact with ongoing price inflation to reduce the attractiveness of 
holding claims on the domestic banking system. In addition, broad money 
supply falls as a proportion of GNP. In particular, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973) postulated that the fragmentation of the capital market resulting from 
financial repression also has adverse consequences for the quality and quantity 
of capital formation. Such consequences include: 
• a reduction in the flow of loanable funds through the organized banking 
system, forcing potential investors to rely more on self-finance; 
• an arbitrary variation in interest rates on the truncated flow of bank lending 
between classes of favoured and dis-favoured borrowers; 
• the impairment of the process of self-finance within enterprises and 
households, primarily because if the real yield on deposits is negative, 
firms cannot easily accumulate liquid assets in preparation for making 
discrete investments, thus making socially costly inflation hedges more 
attractive as a means of internal finance; 
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• significant financial deepening outside the repressed banking system 
becoming impossible when firms are dangerously illiquid and/or inflation 
is high and unstable (McKinnon, 1988). 
Financial liberalization has been recommended as a policy to overcome the 
problems of financial repression, although the experience of the Southern cone 
countries of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in this regard has not been 
encouraging. In spite of this experience, with the advent of SAP, Nigeria 
adopted the policy of financial deregulation, starting with the introduction of 
the second-tier foreign exchange market (SFEM) in 1986 and culminating in 
the policy of deregulation of interest rates in 1987. This study is an attempt to 
evaluate this policy ex post. It aims at using simple descriptive indices to 
assess the impact of policies of financial regulation and deregulation on the 
financial system over time, and in particular on savings mobilization. 
In the second section of this paper we discuss the changes that the Nigerian 
banking system has experienced since its inception with a view to placing the 
different financial policies of the government in proper focus. A review of 
macro policies and environment with a view to highlighting their conditioning 
influence on policies of financial regulation and deregulation is given in 
Section III. Section IV reviews regulatory practices in the Nigerian banking 
system and classifies the different banking regulation periods in Nigeria using 
credit-control practices as criteria, while Section V evaluates the performance 
of the Nigerian banking system vis a vis the regulatory periods identified in 
Section IV and the overview presented in Section III. Section VI presents the 
conclusion and recommendations. 
II The changing face of the 
Nigerian banking system 
Inanga and Soyibo (1989) characterized the changes undergone by the Nigerian 
banking system since 1894, when the African Banking Corporation was 
formed, as consisting of four phases: 
1. the era of relatively stable banking environment (1894-1952); 
2. the first banking boom era (1952-59); 
3. the era of regulation (1959-86); and 
4. the era of deregulation (1986 to date). 
During the first phase, banking business was monopolized by foreign banks, 
namely the African Banking Corporation, which was the precursor of the 
former Standard Bank and the present First Bank of Nigeria; the Colonial Bank 
which predated the former Barclays Bank and the present-day Union Bank; and 
the British and French Bank, the forerunner of the present United Bank of 
Africa. Alleged discrimination against Nigerians by these banks led to the 
founding of indigenous banks which offered little or no competition to the 
foreign banks, essentially because of their weak capital base and low 
managerial capacity. Consequently, all but three of them failed. 
The second phase began with the enactment of the Nigerian Banking 
Ordinance in 1952 which introduced some regulation into banking. The state 
of the economy between 1952 and 1958, and the minimal regulation of the 
industry by the 1952 Ordinance, gave further impetus to the establishment of 
more indigenous banks, all of which failed, during this period. Hence, the 
period is described as the "era of the first banking boom". The bank failures 
of this era were attributed, amongst other things, to the monopolistic nature of 
the foreign banks which enjoyed exclusive patronage from British firms. 
The period 1959-86, the era of banking regulation, began with the 
enactment of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act of 1959 which gave legal 
backing to the establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). This Act 
empowered the CBN to promote and integrate the Nigerian financial system. 
Thus, the CBN was able to enact effective regulatory measures to stem the tide 
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of bank failures that followed the first banking boom. The Act also gave 
substantial incentive to the development of the money and capital markets of 
the country. 
In this new and encouraging climate, more commercial banks sprang up in 
the country. Thus, between 1959 and 1960, eight new commercial banks were 
established, bringing the total number to 12, and this increased to 17 by 1962 
(Teriba, 1970). Under the 1968 Companies Act, foreign-based banks operating 
in Nigeria were obliged to be incorporated in the country. Also during this 
period government implemented the following regulatory measures: 
® acquisition of controlling shares first in the "big three" commercial banks, 
namely, First Bank, Union Bank and the United Bank of Africa; 
• the use of the policy of directed credit; 
® the use of strict control of interest rates; and 
• substantial increase in the paid-up capital of new banks. 
The fourth phase of banking development in Nigeria, the era of deregulation, 
resulting in the second banking boom, came as a result of SAP in which the 
government assigned an increasing role to the market in the allocation of 
resources. It started with the introduction of the second-tier foreign exchange 
market (SFEM) which later became the foreign exchange market (FEM), and 
most recently the inter-bank foreign exchange market (IFEM). The peak of this 
period was probably reached with the deregulation of interest rates when the 
CBN ceased to prescribe interest rates chargeable on loans and advances or 
payable on deposits. This period has been characterized by an increasing 
number of new commercial and merchant banks. Between 1986 and 1 May 
1989, a total of 38 new commercial and merchant banks opened their doors, 
while 25 others were granted licences to start operation before the end of that 
year (Inanga and Soyibo, 1989). 
In particular, between 1988 and 1989, the number of commercial banks 
increased from 40 to 47 (17.5 per cent), while the number of commercial bank 
branches/offices increased from 1,655 to 1,844, representing an increase of 
10.8 per cent (Table 1). The growth in number of merchant banks has been the 
most spectacular. Table 1 shows that the number of merchant banks increased 
nearly 42 per cent from 24 in 1988 to 34 in 1989. At the end of 1989, the total 
number of commercial banks and merchant banks in Nigeria was 81. Currently 
(1990), the number of banks is well over 105 with over 20 licensed to begin 
operations at any time (Nwadike, 1990). 
The period of deregulation has witnessed strategic changes in banking 
operations in Nigeria. Among these changes are the creation of the Nigeria 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) by Decree No. 22 of 15 June 1988 
NIGERIAN BANKING SYSTEM AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 5 
(though the Corporation did not take off effectively until March 1989.) The 
NDIC is charged with the responsibility of insuring bank deposits, ensuring 
safe banking practices through effective supervision, and assisting the CBN to 
formulate banking policies with a view to ensuring the stability of the financial 
system (NDIC, 1989). Given the fears being expressed by Nigerians about the 
proliferation of banks, derisively called "eaglet banks", and the possibility of 
bank failures, the success of the NDIC has probably instilled some confidence 
in the Nigerian banking system. All commercial and merchant banks are 
required by Section 20 of Decree 22 of 1988 to insure their deposits with 
NDIC. Depositors are assured of immediate cash payments up to a maximum 
of 50,000 naira in case of any bank failure (NDIC, 1989). 
Tabls 1 Growth in banks and bank branches (1988/89) 
Total 
End Commercial Merchant no. of 
of No. of No. of No. of No. of branches/ 
year banks offices banks offices b offices 
1988 40 1,655 24 46 1,711 
1989 47 1,844 34 60 1,904 
% growth 17.5 10.8 41.7 30.4 11.3 
Source: Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report and Statement of 
Accounts, 1989. 
Another change witnessed by the banking system during the era of 
deregulation involved the increase in minimum paid-up capital. Effective from 
September 1989, minimum paid-up capital for commercial banks increased 
from 10 million naira to 20 million naira while for commercial banks it 
became 12 million naira (increased from 6 million naira). 
The establishment in 1989 of the People's Bank of Nigeria by the Federal 
Government has changed the concept and practice of banking in Nigeria. This 
bank aims at increasing the access of low-income groups such as artisans, 
craftsmen, mechanics, petty traders, etc., to bank credit. The traditional 
concepts of granting credit, such as collateral, are not employed. Rather, group 
pressure and cohesiveness via co-operatives are the means employed. However, 
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the cjedit granted to the individual is small, varying between 50 and 2,000 
naira. Initial reports at end of the first year of operation suggest that the 
beneficiaries are aware of their loan-repayment obligations. 
The introduction of the community banks, as announced in the 1990 Federal 
Government Budget Speech, is perhaps the most novel and radical of all the 
financial policies introduced by the government since the period of 
deregulation. CBIC (1990) defined a community bank as a self-sustaining 
financial institution, owned and maintained by a community or a group of 
communities, for the purpose of providing credit, banking and financial 
services to its members, largely on their self-recognition and credit-worthiness. 
This is in contrast to the near total reliance of orthodox banks on viable and 
negotiable collateral as the basis for giving credit. 
Community banks perform most of the services of orthodox banks, such as 
acceptance of deposits, issuance of redeemable debentures, and receipt of 
money or collection of proceeds of banking instruments on behalf of 
customers. However, they are required not to engage in sophisticated banking 
services like foreign exchange transactions and international commercial 
papers, corporate finance, etc., in order to enable them to retain their local 
focus (CBIC, 1990). A community bank must raise a minimum equity share 
capital of 250,000 naira before it can be licensed and no individual is allowed 
to own more that 5 per cent of the shares. The community bank operates under 
the concept of unit banking, quite different from the concept of branch banking 
operated by older banks, including most merchant banks, and lately, the 
People's Bank. 
The People's Bank and community banks, it is believed, will be an easier 
means of mobilizing rural savings and giving credit to the rural populace. 
Orthodox banks have failed through the rural banking programme to make 
their presence felt in rural areas, often alleging that branches established in 
rural areas are loss centres. The introduction of the concept of community 
banking and People's Bank is expected to fill this critical gap in the Nigerian 
banking system. 
Ill Overview of 
macroeconomic policies in Nigeria 
The financial system is affected by the larger macroeconomic framework in 
which it operates, for good or for ill. In this section, we provide an overview 
of the general macroeconomic policies of Nigeria with a view to placing in 
proper perspective the likely impact of the economic environment on the 
banking system vis a vis the policies of financial regulation and deregulation. 
The review will concentrate on the macro-policies of the 1980s since the 
decade spans both the eras of financial repression and liberalization in Nigeria. 
In general, the economic policies of the 1980s in Nigeria were designed to 
achieve two major objectives: 
® the acceleration of the rate of domestic production by expanding the 
productive capacity of the non-oil sector, in particular, agriculture and 
manufacturing; 
8 a reduction in the rate of inflation and the attainment of a healthy balance-
of-payrnents position in terms of an acceptable level of external reserves. 
What distinguished this decade is the different policy measures and 
methodologies adopted to achieve the objectives. 
Monetary policy 
At the beginning of the decade, monetary policy was expansionary. For 
example, between 1981 and 1983, the aggregate credit expansion ceiling for 
commercial and merchant banks was as high as 25-35 per cent. The monetary 
measures of that period were ostensibly designed to provide an optimum level 
of bank credit and to channel such credit to more productive and small-scale 
enterprise sectors of the economy as a means of raising the level of 
employment and output of goods and services. The policy of directed credit in 
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1981 required that 56 per cent of banks' credit portfolios be set aside for the 
production sub-sector of the preferred sectors. These sub-sectors consist of 
agricultural production, mining, manufacturing, agro-allied industries, and 
construction. The services sub-sector was expected to have a 12 per cent share 
of total credit. 
The minimum liquidity ratio for the period 1981-83 was 25 per cent, while 
cash ratio was 5 per cent for banks with a minimum 300 million naira deposit 
and 2 per cent for other banks. The rediscount rate in 1981 was 6 per cent, 
while the lending rate for agricultural production by the Nigerian Agricultural 
and Co-operative Bank (NACB) was also 6 per cent. However, in 1982, there 
was an upward revision in interest rate, with the maximum lending rate 
becoming 12 per cent. As part of the austerity measures introduced in April 
1982 to stem the excessive drain on the nation's foreign reserves, interest rates 
were raised by two percentage points across the board, but then revised 
downward again by one percentage point in November of the same year. In 
1983, the maximum lending rate became 13 per cent, while the minimum 
rediscount rate was 7 per cent. Agricultural lending by the NACB attracted 6-7 
per cent interest. 
From 1984, monetary policy began to be restrictive. The objectives were to 
clear the backlog of accumulated trade debt and achieve substantial 
improvement in the balance-of-payments position, to stimulate domestic 
production, especially of food and taw materials, and to reduce the rate of 
inflation. The credit expansion limit for commercial and merchant banks was 
reduced from 25 per cent to 12.5 per cent in 1984, and in 1985 it was further 
reduced to 7 per cent. This became 8 per cent in the first quarter of 1987, only 
to be reduced to 7.4 per cent for the last three quarters of the year. With 
improvements in the economy, the credit expansion limit for banks was raised 
to 12.5 per cent in 1988. However, in 1989, aggregate credit expansion was 
limited to 9.5 per cent. 
The interest-rate ceiling policy continued until 1 August 1987 when interest 
rates were deregulated, while the liquidity ratio remained at 25 per cent until 
1987 when it became 30 per cent at the inception of the policy of financial 
liberalization. This was reduced to 27.5 per cent in 1988. 
Restrictive monetary policy in Nigeria during the 1980s became accentuated 
with the introduction of the second-tier foreign exchange market (SFEM), 
primarily to moderate inflationary pressures likely to accompany its 
introduction. Thus, in 1987, for example, the following credit policy targets 
were set by monetary policy: 
11.8 per cent growth in money supply(M,); 
• 4.4 per cent growth in aggregate bank credit; 
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• 8.4 per cent growth in credit-to the private sector; 
• rediscount rate raised from 11 to 15 per cent effective from 1 August 1987. 
Upward revision of interest rates to encourage mobilization of resources and 
promote a more efficient allocation of available loanable funds characterized 
the period 1984-87 which pre-dated the deregulation of interest rates. Thus, in 
19^4, interest rates generally were raised by 1.5-2 percentage points, except 
that the maximum lending rate and the lending rate for agriculture still 
remained at 13 and 7 percentage points, respectively. However, in 1985, 
interest charged for lending to agricultural production by commercial banks 
was raised to 9 per cent, while that of the NACB was raised from 6-7 per cent 
to 8-9 per cent. 
Fiscal and commercial policies 
The major objectives of the fiscal and commercial policies of the Federal 
Government of Nigeria in the 1980s were: 
• moderation of inflationary pressures; 
• promotion of equitable distribution of income; 
• promotion of the use of local raw materials; 
• reduction in the level of imports with a view to relieving the heavy 
pressures on the nation's external reserves as well as stabilizing the 
exchange rate of the naira; and 
• generation of increased government revenue, particularly from non-oil 
sources. 
The first half of the decade was characterized by strict controls, as 
exemplified by the use of the policy of import restriction and use of import 
licences. At the beginning of the decade there were some restrictions on 
imports, and import licences were required to import some commodities while 
others were placed on open general licence. However, as an anti-inflationary 
measure, in 1981 the government stopped the issuance of licences to 
individuals for the importation of rice. By 1983, when the economy had gone 
deeper into recession, a total of 152 commodities were added to the list of 
imports requiring import licences. In particular, individual raw materials and 
intermediate goods, which hitherto were largely on open general licence, were 
also brought under specific import licence to enhance control over foreign 
exchange expenditure. 
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The policy of protecting local industries underlies the import duty policy of 
government during the decade under review. For example, in 1982, import 
duty on tyres was raised from 55 kobo to 65 kobo per kilogramme, while a 5 
per cent duty was imposed on bolts and nuts, which hitherto had been duty-
free. Many more items had their import duties revised upward in 1983, an 
example being the import duty on starch which was increased from 33.3 per 
cent to 100 per cent with a view to stimulating production. The approved users 
scheme and the general concessionary rates of duty, which granted low and 
concessionary rates on raw materials and other intermediate products imported 
by designated manufacturers producing import-substitutes, were abolished in 
1984. In addition, an ad valorem tax ranging from 10 to 75 per cent was levied 
on raw materials and intermediate products which hitherto attracted low rates. 
These policy instruments were aimed at encouraging local sourcing of raw 
materials. 
A comprehensive tariff structure, designed to last for seven years, was 
adopted in 1988 and was expected to provide a higher degree of protection for 
local industries and reduction in the number of excisable products. In 1989, to 
protect local industries further, import duties on a number of intermediate 
products used in local industries were reduced; an example was battery parts 
where import duty was reduced from 45 to 20 per cent. 
In the 1980s, taxation policy was aimed at raising greater revenue for the 
government. Thus, in 1981, there was an amendment to the Companies Income 
Tax Law which empowered the Federal Board of Inland Revenue to impose 
a maximum tax of 2 per cent based on turnover or 45 per cent of taxable 
profit, whichever is higher. Also, the Income Tax Management Act of 1961 
and the Companies Income Tax Act of 1979 were amended by the Finance 
(Miscellaneous Taxation Provision) Decree of 1985. Under the amendment, the 
rate of tax deductible at source in respect of rents, dividends and interest rose 
from 12.5 to 15 per cent. The maximum capital allowance for manufacturing 
companies was set at 75 per cent of assessable income, while the straight-line 
method of depreciation was adopted in calculating capital allowance for the 
purpose of tax relief. 
Another objective of taxation policy during the period was the promotion 
of investment with a view to reflating the economy. Among the instruments 
used to pursue the achievement of this objective were the following policies 
adopted since 1988: 
• exemption from taxation of all investment incomes earned outside Nigeria; 
9 adoption of a lower company tax rate of 20 per cent for 3 years for small 
and medium-sized companies with annual turnover of 500,000 naira and 
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-below engaged either in manufacturing, agricultural production or mining 
of solid minerals; and 
® the adoption of a 15 per cent maximum tax for all investment incomes. 
In general, commercial policy in the 1980s aimed at protecting infant 
domestic industries and encouraging food production. To achieve the latter, 
guaranteed minimum prices for major staple food crops were increased in 
1981. The early years of the decade witnessed relaxation of foreign exchange 
controls, with an individual basic travel allowance which was well over $1,000 
before the recession. Foreign exchange controls were introduced in 1982 at the 
beginning of the recession. The introduction of SFEM in 1986 decontrolled 
foreign exchange allocation leaving the determination of its value to market 
forces. Two major methods have been adopted in determining the value of the 
naira in terms of other major currencies such as the dollar, the pound sterling 
and the deutschmark. These were the marginal rate method and the Dutch 
auction method. A major consequence of both methods is the massive 
depreciation of the naira which in April 1991 stood at about 8.80 to the dollar. 
However, it appears that the naira depreciates more with the Dutch auction 
method. Government, through the intervention of the CBN, had adopted 
several methods of mopping up liquidity in the banking system to strengthen 
the naira. One such method is the use of stabilization securities. 
IV A review of the regulatory practices in 
Nigerian banking 
The CBN, on behalf of the Federal Government of Nigeria, issues annual 
credit policy guidelines to banks and other financial institutions like insurance 
companies. Up to 1990, 24 such policy circulars had been issued. Each 
monetary policy circular, as the credit guidelines are often called, begins with 
a review of the performance of the economy for the preceding year with a 
view to putting the new government policy guidelines in focus in relation to 
the objectives and targets being proposed. 
The guidelines then provide the aggregate credit ceilings for the fiscal year 
in question for commercial and merchant banks, prescribe the sectoral 
distribution of loans and advances by banks and spell out the structure of 
merchant and/or commercial bank assets. The circular also contains policy 
information relating to loans to indigenous borrowers and rural areas, capital 
funds of banks, as well as reserve requirements. The interest-rate policy to be 
pursued during the year, deadlines and milestones on the rendition of 
mandatory monetary and financial statistics by banks to the CBN, as well as 
penalties prescribed for default, are also contained in the monetary policy 
circular. 
One way in which these regulatory practices can be classified relates to the 
degree of disaggregation of sectoral credit allocation. We posit that the greater 
the level of disaggregation of sectoral distribution of credit, the higher the 
degree of control and regulation. This is because banking operators tend to 
have less freedom and flexibility of operation in such situations. 
Accordingly, we classify the practice of banking regulation in Nigeria into 
four periods, thus: 
• the era of strict control lasting up to 1983 and coinciding with the period 
when there were up to 18 sector/sub-sector categories of credit allocation; 
• the era of less strict control (in contrast to moderate control) between 1984 
and 1985 when the sectoral/sub-sectoral categorization of credit was 
compressed to eight; 
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9 }he period of moderate control, consisting only of the year 1986, when the 
sectoral categorization was compressed to four and this coincided with the 
beginning of the era of financial liberalization; and 
® the era of relaxed control/deregulation from 1987 to the present when the 
two-sector categorization of credit was introduced. 
Table 2 summarizes the sectoral categorizations of credit allocation during 
these periods, based on the scheme described above. 
In 1985, Monetary Policy Circular No. 19 directed that the merchant banks' 
portfolio of financial assets should be structured as follows: 
• a minimum of 50 per cent of total loans and advances shall be medium-
term in nature with maturity of not less than three years; 
• a maximum of 20 per cent of loans and advances shall be short-term in 
nature, i.e. maturing within 12 months; and 
• a maximum of 15 per cent of total assets shall be in equipment leasing. 
The year 1985 also marked the introduction of grace periods varying from 
one year (for seasonal cash crops like cotton and groundnuts) to seven years 
(for ranching) in agricultural lending. Also, effective from January 1985, new 
banking application and licence fees of 2,500 naira and 10,000 naira 
respectively, were fixed. These measures were still in effect in 1990. In effect, 
more measures aimed at effecting and ensuring soundness of the financial 
system were put in place from the period of less strict control. 
Complementary measures that ensure flexibility of operations on the part of 
the banking industry began to be put in place from the eras of moderate and 
relaxed control. For example, while interest rates were not deregulated in 1986, 
in spite of the introduction of the SFEM, from October 1987 the interest-rate 
policy was made more flexible with the credit guidelines specifying the 
rediscount rate and the maximum lending rate. In 1987, greater flexibility of 
operation was granted to merchant banks with the ratio of loans and advances 
to total assets being raised from 50 to 55 per cent. 
By 1988, in another forward-looking policy decision, the CNB's credit 
policy guideline provided a new definition of the small-scale enterprise as one 
whose turnover is not more than 500,000 naira (when dealing with commercial 
banks) and whose limit of investment is 2 million naira (excluding cost of 
land), or which has a maximum turnover of 5 million naira (when dealing with 
a merchant bank). In 1988 banks were granted permission to own equity in 
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companies. However, no bank may invest more than 10 per cent of its paid-up 
capital in one company and its overall ownership in various enterprises may 
not exceed 33.3 per cent. 
It is perhaps the 1990 credit policy guidelines that have been most flexible 
and accommodating. For example, in order to allow new banks to grow, any 
such bank with total credit not exceeding 50 million naira at the end of 
December 1989 would be allowed to attain a credit level of 50 million naira 
before any ceiling on credit growth is applied. It also relaxed the restrictions 
on the structure of merchant banks' financial assets portfolio while granting 
commercial banks permission to engage in equipment leasing to the tune of 15 
per cent of their total assets. However, the guidelines raised the capital 
adequacy ratio from 1:12 to 1:10. Besides, the guidelines requested banks with 
subsidiary companies to report on the operation of such companies along with 
their own reports. Also, merchant banks, which were hitherto excluded from 
the observance of cash-reserve requirements, were subjected to a cash-reserve 
requirement of 5 per cent of their total demand deposit liability. Thus, the era 
of financial liberalization seems to be installing universal banking practices in 
Nigeria. 
V Performance analysis 
Savings mobilization 
Among the arguments advanced in favour of financial liberalization is the fact 
that strict regulation of the financial markets, particularly the policies of 
directed credits and sectoral prescription of...interest*ate ceilings, often 
promotes present consumption and acts as a disincentive to saving. In this 
section we provide a descriptive analysis of the extent of mobilization of 
savings by the formal Nigerian financial system during the period under study 
with a view to identifying possible trends in the reactions of Nigerian savers 
to change in government monetary policy. 
Tables 3 and 4 give an analysis of institutional savings between 1970 and 
1989, while Tables 5 and 6 show the same information in real terms. Figure 
1 provides visual representation of the data. The tables show that commercial 
banks dominate thejmaris£lJ&^^ in Nigeria. I n j h e 197.0s, 
tfjeyjmolaiized between 80 and 89 per cent of total institutional deposits. 
However, in the 1980s, this pre-eminent position, though still maintained, 
began to be eroded by merchant banks which controlled between 10 and 27 per 
cent of the market share of institutional savings between 1985 and 1988. In the 
early 1970s, the merchant banks' share was only slightly above 1 per cent; 
thus this nearly ten-fold improvement in the mobilization of savings between 
1985 and 1986 is commendable. This may not be unconnected with the 
increasing number of merchant banks that have come on the scene with the 
advent of financial liberalization (Table 1). 
Both tables show that banks predominate in the mobilization of deposits in 
the Nigerian financial market, controlling over 90 per cent of the market. Of 
all the other financial intermediaries, the National Provident Fund is the one 
that seems to have some applicable impact, although, by the 1980s it had 
begun to trail behind merchant banks. 
In order to assess the effects of the policies of financial repression and 
liberalization on deposit mobilization, the data of Tables 5 and 6, which are 
in real terms, were utilized. A comparison of the growth rates in Tables 3 and 
4, on the one hand, and Tables 5 and 6 on the other, shows marked 
Table 3 Analysis of cumulative institutional savings in Nigeria (1970-79) 
Premium bond 
Commercial National Federal Federal Merchant savings cert. Annual 
banks: time Provident Savings Mortgage Bank time and savings growth 
Year and savings Fund Bank Bank deposits stamp Total rate (%) 
1970 336.7 
(80.24) 
67.4 
(16.06) 
1971 371.8 
(80.09) 
76.6 
(16.50) 
1972 456.9 
(80.65) 
89.2 
(15.75) 
1973 582.3 
(80.97) 
109.7 
(15.25) 
1974 973.2 
(85.59) 
129.8 
(11.42) 
1975 1,572.3 
(86.60) 
159.9 
(8.81) 
1976 1,979.1 
(87.75) 
193.9 
(8.60) 
4.9 2.6 7.6 
(1.17) (0.61) (1.88) 
4.5 4.0 7.2 
(0.94) (6.86) (1.55) 
4.3 5.3 10.8 
(0.75) (0.94) (1.91) 
4.5 5.5 17.1 
(0.63) (0.77) (2.38) 
4.7 7.3 22.3 
(0.41) (0.64) (1.94) 
8.1 11.8 63.4 
(0.45) (0.65) (3.49) 
6.9 16.3 58.9 
(0.31) (0-72) (2.62) 
0.1 419.6 
(n) (100.0) 
0.1 464.2 9.9 
(n) (100.0) 
0.1 566.5 22.0 
(n) (100.0) 
0.1 719.2 27.0 
(n) (100.00) 
0.1 1,137.1 58.1 
(n) (100.0) 
0.1 1,815.6 59.7 
(n) (100.0) 
0.1 2,255.2 24.2 
(n) (100.0) 
(cont. . .) 
Table 3 cont . . . 
Premium bond 
Commercial National Federal Federal Merchant savings cert. Annual 
banks: time Provident Savings Mortgage Bank time and savings growth 
Year and savings Fund Bank Bank deposits stamp Total rate (%) 
1977 2,255.1 230.4 
(87.44) (8.90) 
1978 2,601.7 269.9 
(86.44) (9.97) 
1979 3,702.1 305.1 
(89.06) (7.33) 
8.0 11.9 82.4 
(0.26) (0.64) (3.68) 
8.1 19.2 110.7 
(0.26) (0.64) (3.68) 
8.5 23.7 117.3 
(0.20) (0.57) (2.82) 
0.1 2,587.9 14.8 
(n) (100.0) 
0.1 3,009.7 16.3 
(n) (100.0) 
0.1 3,156.8 38.1 
(n) (100.0) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are percentages; n = negligible; values are as at end of December, million naira, at current prices. 
Table 4 Analysis of cumulative institutional savings in Nigeria (1970-79) 
Year 
Commercial Premium bond 
banks: time National Federal Federal Merchant savings cert, 
and savings Provident Savings Mortgage Bank time and savings 
deposits Fund Bank Bank deposits stamp Total 
Annual 
growth 
rate (%) 
1980 5,163.2 338.9 7.3 40.7 219.7 0.1 5,769.9 38.8 
(89.49) (5.87) (0.71) (0.71) (3.81) (n) (100.0) 
1981 6,023.5 370.1 5.3 57.2 328.0 0.1 6,784.2 17.6 
(88.78) (5.46) (0.08) (0.84) (4.83) (n) (100.0) 
1982 6,838.2 411.5 4.0 69.3 691.3 0.1 8,014.9 18.1 
(85.32) (5.4) (0.05) (0.86) (8.63) (n) (100.0) 
1983 8,082.9 472.8 5.0 89.9 793.7 0.1 9,443.9 11.8 
(85.46) (4.59) (0.05) (0.95) (8.40) (n) (100.0) 
1984 9,391.3 504.7 8.0 114.0 970.6 0.1 10,988.7 16.4 
(85.46) (4.59) (0.07) (1.04) (8.83) (n) (100.0) 
1985 10,550.9 540.5 8.1 114.9 1,318.2 0.1 12,532.7 14.1 
(84.19) (4.3) (0.07) (0.99) (10.52) (n) (100.0) 
(cont. . .) 
Table 4 cont... 
Commercial 
Year 
banks: t 
and sav 
depos 
me 
ngs 
ts 
National 
Provident 
Fund 
Federal 
Savings 
Bank 
Federal 
Mortgage 
Bank 
Merchant 
Bank time 
deposits 
Premium bond 
savings cert, 
and savings 
stamp Total 
Annual 
growth 
rate (%) 
1986 11,487.7 579.6 17.0 125.6 1,739.7 0.1 13,949.7 11.3 
(82.35) (4.16) (0.12) (0.90) (12.47) (n) (100.0) 
1987 15,068.7 593.5 20.2 148.6 2,822.8 0.1 18,673.9 33.9 
(80.69) (3.18) (0.11) (0.80) (15.12) (n) (100.0) 
1988 18,397.1 605.0 22.4 180.4 3,982.8 0.1 23,187.8 24.2 
(79.34) (2.61) (0.10) (0.78) (17.18) (n) (100.0) 
1989 16,976.9 679.1 37.5 n.a. 2,505.2 0.1 20,198.8 -12.9 
(84.05) (3.36) (0.19) (12.40) (n) (100.0) 
Source: computed from Central Bank of Nigeria: Annual Report and Statement of Accounts (various issues) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are percentages; n = negligible; n.a. = not available: * provisional; values are as at end of December, 
million naira, at current prices. 
Table 5 Analysis of cumulative institutional savings in Nigeria (1970-79) 
Commercial 
Year 
banks: t 
and sav 
depos 
me 
ngs 
ts 
National 
Provident 
Fund 
Federal 
Savings 
Bank 
Federal 
Mortgage 
Bank 
Merchant 
Bank time 
deposits 
Premium bond 
savings cert, 
and savings 
stamp Total 
Annual 
growth 
rate (%) 
1973 1,289.4 242.9 10.0 12.2 37.9 0.22 1,592.6 -
(80.97) (15.25) (0.63) (0.77) (2.38) (n) (100.0) 
1974 1,452.2 193.7 7.0 10.9 33.3 0.15 1,697.3 6.6 
(85.59) (11.42) (0.41) (0.64) (1.94) (n) (100.0) 
1975 1,989.5 202.3 10.2 14.9 80.22 0.13 2,297.3 35.4 
(86.60) (8.81) (0.45) (0.65) (3.49) (n) (100.0) 
1976 2,174.8 213.1 7.6 17.9 64.7 0.11 2,478.21 7.9 
(87.74) (8.60) (0.31) (0.72) (2.62) (n) (100.0) 
1977 2,255.1 230.4 8.0 11.9 82.4 0.1 2,587.9 4.4 
(87.44) (8.90) (0.26) (0.64) (3.68) (n) (100.0) 
1978 2,336.9 242.4 7.3 17.3 99.5 0.09 2,703.5 4.5 
(86.44) (9.97) (0.26) (0.64) (3.68) (n) (100.0) 
1979 2,9.82.4 245.7 6.9 19.1 94.5 0.08 3,348.7 23.9 
(89.06) (7.33) (0.20) (0.57) (2.82) (n) (100.0) 
1980 3,838.2 251.9 5.4 30.3 163.3 0.07 4,289.17 28.1 
(89.49) (5.87) (0.71) (0.71) (3.81) (n) (100.0) 
D 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are percentages; n = negligible; values are in real terms at 1977 prices (million naira) co 
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Year 
Commercial 
banks: time 
and savings 
deposits 
National 
Provident 
Fund 
Federal 
Savings 
Bank 
Federal 
Mortgage 
Bank 
Merchant 
Bank time 
deposits 
Premium bond 
savings cert, 
and savings 
stamp Total 
Annual 
growth 
rate (%) 
1981 8,282.0 508.9 7.3 78.6 451.0 0.13 9,327.9 _ 
(88.78) (5.46) (0.08) (0.84) (4.83) (n) (100.0) 
1982 8,840.6 432.0 5.2 89.6 893.7 0.13 10,361.23 11.1 
(85.32) (5.4) (0.05) (0.86) (8.63) (n) (100.0) 
1983 9,583.7 580.6 5.9 106.6 941.1 0.12 11,198.02 8.1 
(85.46) (4.59) (0.05) (0.95) (8.46) (n) (100.0) 
1984 9,391.3 504.7 8.0 114.0 970.6 0.1 10,998.7 -1.9 
(85.46) (4.59) (0.07) (1.04) (8.83) (n) (100.0) 
1985 10,106.2 517.7 7.8 110.1 1,262.6 0.09 12,004.5 9.2 
(84.19) (4.3) (0.07) (0.99) (10.52) (n) (100.0) 
1986 11,222.8 566.2 16.6 122.7 1,699.5 0.09 13,627.9 13.5 
(82.35) (4.16) (0.12) (0.90) (12.47) (n) (100.0) 
1987 10,804.3 425.5 14.5 106.5 2,023.9 0 .07 13,374.8 -1.9 
(80.69) (3.18) (0.11) (0.80) (15.12) (n) (100.0) 
1988 10,028.4 329.8 12.2 98.3 2,171.1 0.06 12,639.9 5.5 
(79.34) (2.61) (0.10) (0.78) (17.18) (n) (100.0) 
1989 5,927.1 237.1 13.1 n.a. 874.6 0 .04 7,051.9 -44.2 
(84.05) (3.36) (0.19) n.a. (12.40) (n) (100.0) 
1990 7,029.15 246.1 * 93.7 1,151.4 0.04 8,520.74 20.8 
(82.5) (2.9) (1.1) (13.5) (n) (100.0) 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentages; n = negligible; n.a. = not available: * = transformed to a commercial bank. 
Values are in real terms at 1984 prices (million naira). 
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differences. It is easily seen that the growth rates in deposit mobilization are 
exaggerated at constant prices. From the tables it can be seen that the real 
growth rates of deposit mobilization varied between 4.5 and 7.9 per cent in 
1975, 1979 and 1980. The real growth rate of 35.4 per cent experienced in 
1975 may have been due to the sudden oil wealth that came in the wake of the 
Arab-Israeli War and the sudden increase in oil prices. In the same way, the 
high growth rates in 1979 and 1980 may have been due to the expansionary 
monetary policy of the civilian administration. 
By discounting the effect of expansionary monetary policy, it appears that, 
using the real growth rate, the type of financial system control regime has 
some effect on deposit mobilization by the banking system. This is easily 
brought to focus by using the real annual growth rate figures of Table 6. In 
this table, it is seen that the real annual growth rate in the latter part of the era 
of strict control is less in general than that of the period of less strict control 
and that of the era of relaxed control/deregulation except for the real negative 
growth rate in 1989. 
Figure 1 Composition of institutional savings in Nigeria (1972-88) 
Table 7 Some indices of financial intermediation in Nigeria (at current prices) 
Total GDP ' Ratio of Ratio of 
institutional at current Money supply institutional institutional 
deposits factor cost M 2 " deposit deposit Ratio of M2 
Year (naira m) (naira m) (naira m) to GDP to M2 to GDP 
1970 419.6 5,621.00 956.9 0.08 0.44 0.17 
1971 464.2 7,098.00 1,005.3 0.07 0.46 0.14 
1972 566.5 7,703.00 1,161.4 0.07 0.49 0.15 
1973 719.2 10,991.00 1,414.0 0.07 0.51 0.13 
1974 1,137.1 18,811.00 2,156.2 0.06 0.53 0.11 
1975 1,815.6 21,779.00 3,624.6 0.08 0.50 0.17 
1976 2,255.2 27,572.00 5,467.9 0.08 0.41 0.20 
1977 2,587.9 32,520.00 6,310.5 0.08 0.41 0.19 
1978 3,009.7 35,540.00 7,395.6 0.09 0.41 0.21 
1979 4,156.8 36,593.30 9,848.7 0.11 0.42 0.27 
1980 5,769.9 41,479.80 14,397.4 0.14 0.40 0.35 
1981 6,784.2 50,456.63 15,548.1 0.14 0.44 0.31 
1982 8,014.4 51,570.32 16,894.0 0.16 0.47 0.33 
1983 9,443.9 56,709.77 19,368.9 0.17 0.49 0.34 
1984 10,988.7 63,066.19 21,600.5 0.17 0.51 0.34 
1985 12,532.7 71,368.10 23,818.6 0.18 0.53 0.33 
1986 13,949.7 72,128.24 24,592.7 0.19 0.57 0.34 
1987 18,673.9 106,883.20 29,994.6 0.18 0.62 0.28 
1988 23,187.8 142,678.26 38,449.9 0.16 0.60 0.27 
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Sources: 
* For 1970-79, International Financial Statistics Year Book(1970-1985) and Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, years 1979-88. 
** CBN, Economic and Financial Review and Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial Indicators 
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Table 7 provides some descriptive indices of financial intermediation in 
Nigeria between 1970 and 1988. Between 1970 and 1979, the ratio of 
institutional deposits to GDP varied between 0.06 and 0.11 with an average of 
0.08 (Table 8). In the 1980s, the ratio increased to about 0.19 (1986) and 
declined to 0.18 and 0.16 in 1987 and 1988, respectively. This ratio can be 
interpreted as the proportion of the national output that is put away as savings. 
Thus, in general, it can be seen that Nigerians have rather poor banking habits. 
From Table 8 it can be seen that the proportion of national output that is 
saved in Nigeria does not appear related to the type of regulation imposed on 
the financial system. This is because the average proportion of the GDP that 
is saved institutionally varied between 0.08 and 0.18 during the era of strict 
regulation, increasing marginally to 0.19 during the period of moderate control, 
only to decline to 0.17 during the period of relaxed control/deregulation. 
However, the impact of restrictive monetary policy during the period of 
relaxed control/deregulation, as mentioned earlier, may be responsible for this 
observation. Thus, conflict of policies is one area that needs to be addressed 
formally by Nigerian policy makers if the intended results are to be effectively 
and efficiently achieved. 
What can also be deduced from Table 7 is that Nigeria showed little 
improvement in saving part of the national product since the 1970s. Indeed, 
when this result is compared with that of Bhatia and Khatkhate (1975), Nigeria 
has not shown much improvement over its performance in the 1960s either. 
Besides, Nigeria lagged behind other African countries like Cote d'lvoire, 
Kenya, Malawi and Zambia over the period 1960-70. There is, therefore, a 
need for Nigerians to improve their savings habits in order to generate 
investible funds internally in line with the policy of self-reliance. 
From Table 7, the ratio of institutional deposits to broad money supply, M 2 
can be seen to vary between 40 per cent and 62 per cent. This ratio can be 
interpreted as the proportion of broad money in circulation that is saved in the 
formal system. In general, Nigerians can be said to save, on the average, about 
50 per cent of M 2. This also indicates poor saving habits. 
Another index that can be used to assess the impact of financial 
intermediation is the ratio of M 2 to GDP. McKinnon (1988) describes this ratio 
as measuring bank loanable funds. 
The ratio can be interpreted as the proportion of the national product that 
is available as currency in circulation, consisting of part of the pool that will 
be available to banks to give out as loans. Thus, this ratio can be used as a 
possible proxy for measuring the link between money supply and investment. 
However, the ratio between institutional deposits and money supply can 
measure this link more directly through savings-mobilization efforts, 
particularly of the banking system. 
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The table shows that in the 1970s the value of the ratio for Nigeria varied 
between 0.11 and 0.27, with an average of 0.17 (Table 8). This performance 
is below that of the four Latin American and the four Asian countries studied 
by McKinnon (1988) whose averages were, respectively, 0.18 and 0.25 for the 
period 1960-80. However, the ratio improved to about 0.34 over the period 
1984-86, and declined to 0.28, on average, during the period 1987-88 (Table 
8). Nigeria's performance during the 1980s compares favourably with that of 
Korea whose values were 0.32-0.33 between 1970 and 1980. However, Nigeria 
lagged considerably behind Japan (between 0.86 and 1.39), Germany (between 
0.58 and 0.91), Taiwan (between 0.46 and 0.75) and Singapore (between 0.70 
and 0.83), during the period 1970-80 (McKinnon, 1988). 
From Table 8, it can also be deduced that the variation in the ratio of M 2 
to GDP does not seem related to any policy of regulation or deregulation of 
the banking system. However, the variation in the average real growth rate of 
institutional savings suggests some link, even if weak, between the different 
regulatory regimes of the financial system and the deposit mobilized. Thus, 
there is a tendency for the average real growth rate to rise with more relaxed 
control. The observed negative growth rate during the era of relaxed 
control/deregulation can be attributed mainly to the very high negative growth 
rate of 1989 which may be due more to inflation than anything else. A formal 
modelling method was used in another study (Soyibo and Adekanye, 1990) to 
confirm this claim. 
Increase in the number of banks 
There is no denying the fact that financial liberalization has brought about a 
sudden increase in the number of banks operating in Nigeria. Table 9 shows 
that 43 banks were established in Nigeria between 1986 and 1989. We recall 
that 1986 was the beginning of the period of financial liberalization — the year 
we described as the period of moderate control. Of these 43 banks, 42 were 
established during the era of relaxed control/liberalization. More than half (54 
per cent) were merchant banks. Thus, there is likely to be keener competition 
in the industry, resulting in the designing of new products. 
Nwadike (1990) reported the existence of 151 different banking products in 
Nigeria in 1990, though analysis showed that most of these instruments need 
more creativity and ingenuity; However, the fact that the Nigerian banks are 
now challenged to create different products is an indication of increasing 
competition, which will lead to an improvement inbank seryice delivery. The 
era of "arm chair" banking is gone. People also fear possible bank failures as 
a result of the increasing application of aggressive banking practices. From 
Table 8 Some descriptive performance measures of regulation and deregulation in Nigeria 
Strict control 
period 
(.A970-791 (,1980-831 
Less strict 
control period 
(.1984-851 
Moderate control 
period 
(19861 
Relaxed control/ 
deregulation 
period 
(Jrom 19871 
Average institutional 
deposit (million naira 
current prices) 1,713.8 
Average ratio of 
institutional deposit 
to GDP 0.08 
Average ratio of 
institutional deposit 
to M2 0.46 
Average ratio of 
M2 to GDP 0.17 
Average annual real 
growth rate of 
institutional deposits 
(%) 13.8* 
7,503.1 
0.15 
0.45 
0.33 
9.6* 
10,216.3 
0.18 
0.52 
0.34 
3.7 
13,949.7 
0.19 
0.57 
0.34 
13.5 
20,930.9 
0.17 
0.61 
0.28 
-5.0 
Notes: *1974-79 "1982-83 ; 1973-79 growth rates are based on 1977 prices while the others are based on 1984 prices. 
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Table 9 Number of new banks in Nigeria (1986-89) 
29 
1986 1987 1988 1989 Total 
Commercial banks 1 5 7 7 20 
Merchant banks - 4 9 10 23 
Total 1 9 16 17 43 
Source: Inanga and Soyibo (1989) for 1986-88 values; NDIC (1989) for 1989 values 
Table 3, we see a 12.9 per cent decline in the growth of total institutional 
savings between 1988 and 1989. NDIC (1989) attributed this to increased 
competition for deposits by banks and an interest-rate "war". In a moderating 
tone, the 1990 CBN Credit Policy Guidelines stipulated the maximum spread 
between the savings rate and the prime lending rate for each bank. This is put 
at 7.5 percentage points. Similarly, the margin between the prime rate and the 
highest lending rate was put at a maximum of 4 percentage points, while the 
inter-bank interest rate was put at least 1 percentage point below the prime rate 
for each lending bank. 
VI Conclusion and recommendations 
The balance sheet on the policies of financial regulation and deregulation in 
Nigeria, as discussed in this paper, suggests that there is more in favour of the 
policy of financial deregulation than against it. The policy of financial 
liberalization has changed the face of the Nigerian banking system. There is 
an increase in the number of banks, promoting competition in the industry. 
Furthermore, banking, as it was traditionally known in Nigeria, has changed 
with the introduction of the People's Bank and Community Banks. Besides 
changes in the practice of banking, the adoption of the unit banking concept 
underlying community banking is a novelty in Nigeria. Before the inception 
of community banks, branch banking was the vogue. The dividing line between 
merchant and commercial banking is becoming thinner and thinner with 
financial liberalization as some functions which used to be the exclusive 
preserve of merchant banks (e.g. equipment leasing) are now performed by 
commercial banks. Thus, financial liberalization is introducing the concept of 
universal banking into Nigeria. 
We have shown in this paper that there is some evidence, however weak, 
that there is a positive relationship between savings mobilization and financial 
liberalization in Nigeria, as we argued that the apparent decline in some 
indices of financial liberalization during the era of relaxed control/deregulation 
is due mainly to conflict of policies rather than the policy of liberalization per 
se. Accordingly, it is suggested that policy makers should endeavour to avoid 
conflicting policies so as to minimize their undesired effects. 
This study has also shown that Nigerians appear to have poor banking 
habits when compared with other Africans. It is, therefore, suggested that 
deliberate policies promoting deposit mobilization among Nigerians, even if 
mandatory, be put in place. Nigerians cannot claim to be poorer than other 
Africans who put away a higher proportion of their national product against 
a rainy day. The desire to pursue the self-reliant strategy that is entailed in 
SAP demands personal sacrifice. This will probably be rewarding to the 
economy as the banking sector is likely to be particularly good in allocation 
of the domestic credit so mobilized to the most socially productive uses. 
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